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Death of a Benchmark:  The Fall of LIBOR and the 
Rise of Alternative Rates in the United Kingdom and 
United States 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) is a seemingly 
obscure number, but may be one of the most influential elements of the 
global financial system.1  LIBOR is a major financial benchmark, 
underpinning trillions of dollars in financial products from credit cards to 
student loans to mortgages.2  In total, roughly $350 trillion worth of 
financial contracts are pegged to LIBOR.3  The pervasiveness of LIBOR 
in the financial system, affecting everything “from mortgages in Alabama 
to business loans in Liverpool,” has led to the benchmark being described 
as “the world’s most important number.”4  Jerome Powell, chairman of 
the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors, has described LIBOR 
as “part of the global financial system’s critical infrastructure.”5   
The benchmark rate has been marred by scandal, with major 
banks forced to pay billions of dollars in fines as a part of civil and 
criminal penalties.6  As a result, regulators in both the United States and 
United Kingdom, along with global financial organizations such as the 
 
 1. See Michael J. de La Merced, Q. and A.: Understanding Libor, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (July 10, 2012, 10:38 PM) [hereinafter de la Merced, Understanding Libor], http:/
/dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/q-and-a-understanding-libor/ (explaining that since 
LIBOR is one of the main rates used to determine the borrowing costs for trillions of dollars 
in loans, it is one of the most important numbers in finance). 
 2. See id. (“Interest rates on some mortgages, student loans and credit card accounts go 
up or down when Libor moves.”). 
 3. Tortoise Invs., Replacing LIBOR: The Countdown Begins, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2017, 
2:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tortoiseinvest/2017/08/16/replacing-libor-the-
countdown-begins/#6b17881a4e2b. 
 4. LIAM VAUGHAN & GAVIN FINCH, THE FIX: HOW BANKERS LIED, CHEATED AND 
COLLUDED TO RIG THE WORLD’S MOST IMPORTANT NUMBER ix (2017). 
 5. Jerome H. Powell, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Reforming U.S. Dollar 
LIBOR: The Path Forward (Sept. 4, 2014) https://www.federalreserve.gov/newseve 
nts/speech/powell20140904a.htm; Binyamin Appelbaum, Jerome Powell Is Sworn In as 
Federal Reserve Chairman, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02 
/05/us/politics/jerome-powell-federal-reserve-chairman-sworn-in.html.  
 6. See generally Tracking the Libor Scandal, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/23/business/dealbook/db-libor-timeline.html?_r=0#/
#time370_10900 (last updated Mar. 23, 2016) (detailing the recent history of the benchmark). 
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International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”), have 
published reports outlining the problems with LIBOR and beneficial 
principles for financial benchmarks.7  U.S. and U.K. regulators have 
determined that the reliability of LIBOR for the long term is at the very 
least questionable and have begun the transition to alternative rates.8  
Further, banks are generally unwilling to continue committing to LIBOR 
long-term.9  Continued reliance on LIBOR poses a risk to the financial 
system due to the scale of contracts that reference the rate and the lack of 
fallback provisions within those contracts.10  Regulators and working 
groups in the United States are working to develop an alternative rate in 
the Secured Funding Overnight Rate (“SOFR”), while the United 
Kingdom is preparing to transition to the Sterling Overnight Index 
Average (“SONIA”).11  Both the United States’ and United Kingdom’s 
preferred alternative reference rates are based on transactions in their own 
currency in a robust underlying market.12   
A new LIBOR rate is published each business day, and the 
process is quite simple in theory.13  Each day, a group of banks that sit on 
the reference panel for the InterContinental Exchange (“ICE”) determine 
 
 7. See generally HM TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 
(Sept. 2012) [hereinafter THE WHEATLEY REVIEW], https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191762/
wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf (detailing the inadequacies with LIBOR and 
suggesting improvements to the rate); see generally THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, 
PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS FINAL REPORT (July 2013), https://www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD415.pdf (detailing broad principles that benchmarks should 
meet regarding calculation and governance). 
 8. See Press Release, Alt. Reference Rates Comm., The ARRC Selects a Broad Repo 
Rate as its Preferred Alt. Reference Rate (June 22, 2017), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
medialibrary/microsites/arrc/files/2017/ARRC-press-release-Jun-22-2017.pdf (reporting on 
the Alternative Reference Rates Committee’s decision to transition to a broad repo financing 
rate); see Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive, Fin. Conduct Auth., The Future of LIBOR (July 
27, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/the-future-of-libor (discussing the 
sustainability of LIBOR as it exists today). 
 9. Bailey, supra note 8 (noting that it took a substantial amount of convincing on 
Bailey’s part to get banks to contribute to LIBOR until the 2021 deadline). 
 10. See FIN. POLICY COMM., BANK OF ENGLAND, REC. OF FPC MEETING HELD ON SEPT. 
20, 2017 17–18 (2017) [hereinafter Record of FPC Meeting]. 
 11. Alt. Reference Rates Comm., supra note 8; Reuters, BoE’s Libor Alternative SONIA 
Backed as Benchmark by Dealers, REUTERS (Apr. 28 2017, 3:22 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-boe-rates-regulations/boes-libor-alternative-sonia-backed-as-
benchmark-by-dealers-idUSKBN17U0U2. 
 12. See BANK OF ENGLAND, SONIA: KEY FEATURES AND POLICIES 3–4 (2017); see also 
Request for Information Relating to Production of Rates, 82 Fed. Reg. 41259 (Aug. 30, 2017). 
 13. ICE LIBOR, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE BENCHMARK ADMINISTRATION (IBA), 
https://www.theice.com/iba/libor (last accessed Jan. 7, 2018). 
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at what interest rates they would be willing to lend to other banks.14  The 
panel banks do this for five different currencies, with seven maturities for 
each ranging from overnight to twelve months, leading to a total of thirty-
five rates.15  The top and bottom quartiles of these submissions are 
discarded, with the remaining submissions averaged, producing the 
LIBOR rate for each currency and maturity.16 
This Note argues that the alternative rates chosen by the United 
Kingdom and United States are positive changes from LIBOR.17  These 
alternative reference rates will help keep banks more accountable because 
the rates are tied to transactional data and governed and reported by the 
central bank of each jurisdiction.18  Further, the United Kingdom and 
United States localizing their chosen rate to transactions based on each 
jurisdiction’s own currency will help insulate each rate from geopolitical 
events.19  Finally, this Note argues that financial contracts tied to LIBOR 
must be renegotiated immediately.20  Ultimately, market participants bear 
the responsibility of ensuring a smooth transition from LIBOR to an 
alternative rate, though an intervention on the part of Congress or 
Parliament may aid in such a transition.21  
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part II of this Note details the 
calculation and history of LIBOR, examining the need for alternative 
rates, with a focus on the United States and the United Kingdom.22  Part 
III examines the alternatives proposed by U.S. and U.K. regulators, 
assessing whether the selected alternatives will be less prone to 
manipulation than LIBOR by analyzing the calculation, governance, and 
quality of the rates.23  Finally, Part IV considers the financial contract 
renegotiations that will necessarily occur with the transition away from 
 
 14. LIBOR: What Is It and Why Does It Matter?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/business-19199683. 
 15. ICE LIBOR, supra note 13. 
 16. LIBOR: What Is It and Why Does It Matter?, supra note 14. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See Brexit and U.S. Interest Rates, SEEKING ALPHA (June 23, 2016, 11:25 AM), 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/3983900-brexit-u-s-interest-rates (identifying that a possible 
risk of Brexit could be a heightened spread between LIBOR and the Federal Funds Rate). 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See infra Part IV.  
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
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LIBOR and the steps that parties should take to ensure a smooth 
transition.24 
II. HISTORY AND SCANDAL:  HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
A. What’s in a Number? Calculation, History, and Governance 
LIBOR is the average rate at which banks active in London are 
willing to lend unsecured funds to one another.25  Every morning banks 
that sit on the reference panel submit their answer to the question:  “At 
what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and 
then accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 
11 a.m. London time [GMT]?”26  LIBOR is the “trimmed average mean” 
of the panel banks’ submissions.27  The highest and lowest 25% of the 
panel banks’ submissions are removed, with the middle 50% of responses 
averaged.28  The benchmark is currently produced for five currencies, 
including the U.S. dollar and U.K. pound, with seven maturities for 
each.29  This creates thirty-five rates published daily at approximately 
11:55 a.m. GMT.30  
LIBOR is currently administered by the Intercontinental 
Exchange Benchmark Administration (“IBA”), a U.K. subsidiary of ICE, 
an American-owned company.31 For each currency that LIBOR is 
produced, there are between eleven and sixteen contributing banks.32  For 
the U.S. dollar LIBOR there are sixteen contributing banks, including 
Barclays, Bank of America, Citibank, Credit Suisse, and JP Morgan 
Chase.33  
 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. de La Merced, Understanding Libor, supra note 1. 
 26. ICE LIBOR, supra note 13. 
 27. LIBOR: Frequently Asked Questions, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE BENCHMARK 
ADMINISTRATION (IBA) (Mar. 2017), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/IBA_LIBOR_FA 
Q. 
 28. Id. 
 29. ICE LIBOR, supra note 13. 
 30. See ICE LIBOR, supra note 13 (explaining that LIBOR is produced for CHF, EUR, 
GBP, JPY, and USD with maturities ranging from overnight to 12 months); LIBOR: 
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 27.  
 31. James McBride, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(last updated Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-libor-scandal. 
 32. ICE LIBOR, supra note 13. 
 33. ICE LIBOR, supra note 13.  Remaining banks include Lloyds Bank, Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi, Cooperatieve Rabobank, Royal Bank of Canada, HSBC Bank, Crédit Agricole 
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LIBOR traces its roots to an $80 million syndicated loan arranged 
by a Greek banker from Manufacturers Hanover’s, Minos Zombanakis, 
to the Shah of Iran in 1969.34  That loan was one of the first that charged 
a variable rate of interest, actively influenced by changing market 
conditions, split amongst a group of banks.35  Zombanakis’ innovation 
helped to spur a boom in the syndicated loan market, with the majority 
using LIBOR to determine the interest charged.36 LIBOR was then 
pegged to bonds, and eventually became one of the most popular rates to 
use as a benchmark for financial contracts.37  
Banks eventually began to borrow funds using LIBOR-based 
contracts, and thus had an incentive to underreport their funding costs.38  
As LIBOR became more central to the global financial markets, pressure 
grew to formalize the rate.39  This pressure resulted in the British 
Bankers’ Association (“BBA”) taking over the rate in 1986, creating a 
formal governance structure.40  However, other than removing the highest 
and lowest 25% of the submissions, versus the averaging of every 
submission, LIBOR remained consistent with Zombanakis’ original 
calculation.41 
 
Corporate & Investment Bank, Deutsche Bank, Société Générale, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation Europe limited, The Norinchukin Bank, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and UBS.  
Id. 
 34. DAVID HOU & DAVID SKEIE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., LIBOR: ORIGINS, 
ECONOMICS, CRISIS, SCANDAL, AND REFORM 1 (Mar. 2014) https://www.newyorkfed.org/
medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr667.pdf. 
 35. VAUGHAN & FINCH, supra note 4, at 13. 
 36. VAUGHAN & FINCH, supra note 4, at 15. 
 37. See VAUGHAN & FINCH, supra note 4, at 16 (explaining that Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher’s “Big Bang” financial deregulation plan made the United Kingdom an extremely 
attractive place to do business, allowing for the markets for derivatives, bonds, and syndicated 
loans to explode). 
 38. See HOU & SKEIE, supra note 34, at 1, 6 (stating that banks allegedly underreported 
borrowing costs in order to “project financial strength amidst market uncertainty.”). 
 39. VAUGHAN & FINCH, supra note 4, at 16. 
 40. See HOU & SKEIE, supra note 34, at 1 (explaining that as a result of the banks whose 
submissions determined the fixing of LIBOR beginning to borrow heavily using LIBOR-
based contracts, the BBA formalized the data collection and governance process for the rate 
in 1986). 
 41. VAUGHAN & FINCH, supra note 4, at 16.  Today, LIBOR is used extensively in 
financial contracts, including derivatives.  LIBOR affects both derivatives products traded 
over-the-counter, such as interest rate swaps, and exchange traded derivatives, such as futures 
contracts.  The floating leg of an interest rate swap is conventionally tied to LIBOR.  Although 
there is no comprehensive data on the use of LIBOR in the financial system, various sources 
indicate that between $30 trillion and $230 trillion in over-the-counter derivatives are based 
on the rate.  Additionally, it is estimated that $150 trillion in exchange traded derivatives are 
tied to LIBOR.  Karen Brettell, Banks to Vote on Alternative to Libor As New Rate 
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B. Bigger Crooks:  Scandal and Reforms 
LIBOR manipulation was widespread, but Barclays was the first 
bank to be implicated in the scandal.42  In early 2008, a Barclays 
employee admitted to a Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“New York 
Fed”) staff member that the rates being posted from the bank were not 
“an honest L[IBOR].”43  In other communications with the New York 
Fed in October of that year, Barclays’ executives stated that LIBOR was 
“unrealistic” and “absolute rubbish.”44  The Barclays employee noted that 
other major banks were not posting legitimate rates, explaining that 
Barclays simply wanted to remain competitive.45  Pre-financial crisis, 
banks were able to manipulate LIBOR upward in order to amass greater 
profits.46  For example, in 2007 the gain—or loss—that Barclays stood to 
make from small changes in LIBOR on any given day was around $40 
million.47  During the financial crisis, however, banks manipulated 
LIBOR downward to shield themselves from the full force of the crisis.48  
For at least two years during the financial crisis, panel banks, including 
Barclays, submitted rates that may have been as much as thirty to forty 
basis points below their actual borrowing costs.49 
Banks, by manipulating LIBOR downward during the financial 
crisis, helped insulate themselves from the volatility of the markets.50  In 
 
Benchmark, REUTERS (June 20, 2017, 11:31 AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-
libor-derivatives/banks-to-vote-on-alternative-to-libor-as-new-rate-benchmark-
idUSKBN19B27R. 
 42. Tracking the Libor Scandal, supra note 6 (showing that Barclays was the first bank 
to reach a settlement with regulators on June 27, 2012). 
 43. Jia Lynn Yang & Danielle Douglas, N.Y. Fed Silent on Barclays’ Admission of 
Rigging Libor, THE WASH. POST (Jul. 24, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/ny-fed-silent-on-barclays-admission-of-rigging-libor/2012/07/24/
gJQA2eWg7W_story.html?utm_term=.0feb60856d7e. 
 44. Michael J. de La Merced & Ben Protess, New York Fed Knew of False Barclays 
Reports on Rates, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 13, 2012, 12:00 PM) [hereinafter de La 
Merced & Protess, New York Fed Knew of False Barclays Reports on Rates], https://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/barclays-informed-new-york-fed-of-problems-with-
libor-in-2007/; Yang & Douglas, supra note 43. 
 45. See Tracking the Libor Scandal, supra note 6 (explaining that the bank wanted to “fit 
in with the rest of the crowd.”). 
 46. The Rotten Heart of Finance, THE ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012), http://
www.economist.com/node/21558281. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. McBride, supra note 31. 
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quoting a lower rate, banks appeared stronger than they actually were.51  
This assured customers that the banks were healthy and made the banks 
appear more creditworthy to peer institutions.52  In a time of 
unprecedented disruption in the financial system, rate manipulation 
provided banks with a “degree of stability in an unstable time.”53  
Barclays, for example, appeared as if it was more stable and less 
desperate for cash than it was during an unstable time in financial history, 
cushioning itself from the full brunt of the crisis.54  Although Barclays 
and other major banks manipulated LIBOR in order to insulate 
themselves from the severe financial instability during 2007 and onward, 
this is not to say that LIBOR didn’t spike during the crisis.55  The 
manipulation, however, certainly had an effect on keeping the rate lower 
than what it probably should have been.56 
The admissions by the Barclays employee and the bank’s 
executives led then President of the New York Fed, Timothy Geithner, to 
communicate with U.K. and U.S. regulators and recommend changes to 
the rate setting process for LIBOR.57  Although Geithner knew of the rate 
manipulation taking place, he recommended reforms only to remove 
incentives to misreport the rate, rather than explicitly inform U.K. 
regulators of specific wrongdoing.58  Geithner’s caution may be owed to 
the ongoing financial crisis,59 but he has nonetheless been forced to 
defend his actions.60  Geithner testified before the House of 
Representatives Financial Services Committee that he had informed U.S. 
 
 51. C. Cowden W. Rayburn, The LIBOR Scandal and Litigation: How the Manipulation 
of LIBOR Could Invalidate Financial Contracts, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 221, 226 (2013). 
 52. Rayburn, supra note 51, at 227. 
 53. McBride, supra note 31. 
 54. McBride, supra note 31. 
 55. See VAUGHAN & FINCH, supra note 4, at 53 (“In August 2007, the spread between 
three-month dollar Libor and the overnight indexed swap . . . jumped from 12 basis points to 
73 basis points. By December it had soared to 106 basis points.”). 
 56. See VAUGHAN & FINCH, supra note 4, at 53 (“Everyone could see that Libor rates had 
shot up, but questions began to be asked about whether they had climbed enough to reflect 
the severity of the credit squeeze.”). 
 57. de La Merced & Protess, New York Fed Knew of False Barclays Reports on Rates, 
supra note 44. 
 58. de La Merced & Protess, New York Fed Knew of False Barclays Reports on Rates, 
supra note 44. 
 59. de La Merced & Protess, New York Fed Knew of False Barclays Reports on Rates, 
supra note 44. 
 60. Jennifer Liberto, Geithner on Defense in Libor Scandal Questioning, CNN (July 25, 
2012, 1:02 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/25/news/economy/geithner-libor/index.htm. 
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regulators of the ongoing rate manipulation, but had raised concerns only 
over the LIBOR calculation process with U.K. regulators.61  In Geithner’s 
eyes, the main responsibility of fixing LIBOR fell to regulators in the 
United Kingdom.62 
Regardless of Geithner’s timidity, financial institutions would not 
be absolved from wrongdoing for their manipulations of LIBOR.63  As 
the worst of the financial crisis waned, the United States Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) was investigating LIBOR manipulation.64  The first 
settlement was reached with Barclays in June 2012.65  As a part of the 
$450 million settlement, Barclays admitted that from 2005 to 2009 some 
of its swaps traders requested that Barclays submit rates that would 
benefit the traders’ positions rather than reflect more accurate rates.66  
Barclays employees also coordinated with traders at others banks to 
submit favorable LIBOR rates.67  
Settlements with other banks followed suit.68  In December 2012, 
UBS reached a $1.5 billion settlement with global authorities for its role 
in the rate manipulation.69  The DOJ filed criminal charges against two 
former UBS traders and secured a guilty plea from a Japanese subsidiary 
of the bank.70  In February 2013, Royal Bank of Scotland received a $612 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Tracking the Libor Scandal, supra note 6. 
 64. STATEMENT OF FACTS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND BARCLAYS BANK PLC, 5 (June 26, 
2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9312012710173426365941.pdf; Ben 
Protess & Mark Scott, Barclays Settles Regulators’ Claims Over Manipulation of Key Rates, 
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 27, 2012, 8:11 AM) [hereinafter Protess & Scott, Barclays 
Settles Regulators’ Claims Over Manipulation of Key Rates], https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/06/27/barclays-said-to-settle-regulatory-claims-over-benchmark-manipulation/. 
 65. Protess & Scott, Barclays Settles Regulators’ Claims Over Manipulation of Key 
Rates, supra note 64. 
 66. STATEMENT OF FACTS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND BARCLAYS BANK PLC, supra note 
64, at 5. 
 67. See STATEMENT OF FACTS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND BARCLAYS BANK PLC, supra 
note 64, at 5. (explaining that certain Barclays traders would receive requests from traders of 
other contributing banks to submit favorable LIBOR rates).  Often, the interbank 
communications between traders about setting Libor was between current Barclays 
employees and former Barclays employees that had since joined other financial institutions.  
The Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 46. 
 68. Tracking the Libor Scandal, supra note 6. 
 69. Tracking the Libor Scandal, supra note 6. 
 70. Mark Scott & Ben Protess, As Unit Pleads Guilty, UBS Pays $1.5 Billion Over Rate 
Rigging, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 12, 2012, 1:45 AM) [hereinafter Scott & Protess, As 
Unit Pleads Guilty, UBS Pays $1.5 Billion Over Rate Rigging], https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/12/19/as-unit-pleads-guilty-ubs-pays-1-5-billion-in-fines-over-rate-rigging/. 
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million fine.71  Rabobank reached a $1 billion settlement in both civil and 
criminal penalties later that year.72   
Emails between traders discovered during the investigation of 
these cases showed the cooperative nature of the rate manipulation 
amongst the contributing banks.73  When one trader at Rabobank 
expressed concern over the rate manipulation taking place, the submitter 
reassured him:  “Don’t worry mate—there’s bigger crooks in the market 
than us guys.”74  All told, close to $10 billion in fines were dealt to banks, 
including JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche Bank, and Citigroup, showing the 
“shocking and brazen degree of unlawfulness” amongst the wide range 
of institutions involved in the scandal.75 
C. Wheatley Review and Call for Transition to Alternative Rates 
As the rate manipulation scandal was made public through reports 
and settlements, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the chief financial 
minister in the United Kingdom, commissioned the Wheatley Review.76  
Led by Martin Wheatley, managing director of the Financial Services 
Authority (“FSA”),77 the review’s purpose was to identify improvements 
 
 71. Tracking the Libor Scandal, supra note 6. 
 72. Tracking the Libor Scandal, supra note 6. 
 73. Chad Bray, Dutch Bank Settles Case Over Libor Deceptions, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Oct. 29, 2013, 8:50 AM) https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/rabobank-to-pay-more-
than-1-billion-in-libor-settlement-chairman-resigns/. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.; Tracking the Libor Scandal, supra note 6.  Over one hundred traders or brokers 
were fired from these major financial institutions and since 2015, twenty-one have been 
criminally charged by both U.S. and U.K. authorities.  Tom Hayes, a former trader for UBS 
and Citigroup, was the first person criminally convicted for manipulation of the LIBOR rate.  
Charged by the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office, Hayes was sentenced to fourteen years in prison.  
While Hayes is appealing his conviction, Serious Fraud Office prosecutors have since 
convicted three other traders from Barclays, with each receiving prison sentences between 
two and six years.  McBride, supra note 31. 
 76. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7; Chancellor of the Exchequer, GOV.UK (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/chancellor-of-the-
exchequer.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer oversees the work of the Treasury.  
Responsibilities include fiscal policy, monetary policy, and ministerial arrangements.  Id. 
 77. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 5.  The FSA was a regulatory body in the 
U.K. from 2001 to 2013.  As a result of perceived mishandling of the financial crisis, the U.K. 
government decided to split the FSA into two separate entities beginning in April 2013, the 
Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) of which Mr. Wheatley was the first chief executive 
and the Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”).   
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that could be made to the calculation and governance of LIBOR.78  The 
Wheatley review noted several key weaknesses in the LIBOR rate that 
eroded the credibility and public trust in the benchmark.79 
One weakness was that LIBOR was structured around a segment 
of the market—interbank lending—that was no longer sufficiently active 
to support it.80  At the time the BBA formalized LIBOR, the interbank 
lending market was functioning well.81  However, with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008, banks were no longer willing to lend to other 
banks without sufficient collateral.82  This forced LIBOR submitters to 
rely more heavily on expert opinion rather than transactional data—a 
system that contains significant room for interpretation, allowing for 
increased manipulation.83  The need for judgment by the submitter 
necessarily involves a “discretion which can be misused.”84  
As a result of the lack of transactional data, Wheatley concluded 
that with the room for interpretation now inherent in the system, both 
banks and their employees had an incentive to manipulate their 
submissions.85  Contributing banks exploited their conflict of interest 
from being both submitters to, and users of, the rate.86  Wheatley 
explained that a bank’s daily LIBOR submission did not ultimately 
indicate its counterparty risk, or ability to live up to its contractual 
obligations, but external parties often used submissions as an indication 
of an institution’s creditworthiness.87  This created an outward incentive 
to submit a rate that made the bank appear more creditworthy, especially 
 
 78. See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 6 (stating that the purposes of the review 
were to reform the current framework for setting and overseeing LIBOR, determine sanctions 
to combat LIBOR abuse, and provide additional policy recommendations for alternate price-
setting mechanisms in financial markets). 
 79. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 7–9. 
 80. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 75. 
 81. See Peter Eavis & Nathaniel Popper, Libor Scandal Shows Many Flaws in Rate-
Setting, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 19, 2012, 7:34 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/07/19/libor-scandal-shows-many-flaws-in-rate-setting/. 
 82. See id. (explaining that “[t]he whole concept of interbank lending died after Lehman 
Brothers collapsed.”). 
 83. See id. (explaining that “[LIBOR] is just opinions that people can disagree with or 
manipulate.”); See also THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 75 (“The mechanism by 
which LIBOR is administered leaves opportunity for contributors to attempt to manipulate 
submissions . . .”). 
 84. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 75. 
 85. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 37–38. 
 86. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 79. 
 87. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 79. 
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in times of market stress.88  There was also an inward, private incentive 
to manipulate LIBOR in a way that benefited the institution.89  A bank’s 
traders had an incentive to manipulate the rate to create favorable trading 
positions.90  Banks possessed assets and liabilities that were sensitive to 
even small changes in LIBOR, creating an incentive for traders to collude 
with other institutions to submit favorable rates.91  This was compounded 
by the fact that many traders and bank employees move between various 
institutions, creating something of a web amongst all of them in terms of 
personal relationships.92  
In addition, Wheatley observed that the mechanism for LIBOR 
submission and administration was itself flawed.93  The structure of 
LIBOR as a polled rate led to the risk of manipulation.94  This was 
exacerbated by the lack of a standard to corroborate individual 
submissions, with there being little to no underlying transactional data.95  
A method of rate calculation in which we simply trust bankers to play by 
the rules, when there is a strong incentive to manipulate and no way to 
corroborate submissions in any meaningful way, is a system designed for 
failure.96 
The Wheatley Review proposed tying the LIBOR rate to actual 
transactional data to help remove the reliance on expert judgment in 
submissions.97  The report also suggested a delay in the publishing of 
individual bank submissions for three months.98  This was intended to 
help remove the incentive for submitters to manipulate the rate in order 
 
 88. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 79–80. 
 89. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 80 (explaining that contributing banks had 
an incentive to exploit their conflicts of interest as contributors to, and users of LIBOR). 
 90. See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 75 (explaining that “Banks and 
individuals working for banks have an incentive to attempt to manipulate the submissions that 
compile the rate, either to signal their perceived creditworthiness or to support trading 
positions.”). 
 91. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 80. 
 92. See The Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 46 (showing that the friendly nature of 
collusion amongst the institutions is due in part because both parties have something to gain, 
but also due in part to the personal relationships that exist between traders from different 
institutions). 
 93. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 75. 
 94. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 73. 
 95. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 82. 
 96. See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 73 (pointing out that other reference 
rates that are set up as a “polled rate” are subject to the same risk of manipulation). 
 97. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 27. 
 98. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 35.  
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to make the bank appear more creditworthy than it actually may be.99  
Wheatley also recommended that LIBOR be administered by a private 
organization rather than a public authority, removing it from the BBA’s 
jurisdiction.100  This would allow for greater independence with a 
separation from the interests of the new governing institution and the 
submitting banks.101 
Recall that following the release of the report, administration of 
LIBOR was transferred from BBA to a U.K. subsidiary, ICE Benchmark 
Administration, of the private U.S.-based company, ICE.102  Despite this 
new governance system, the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) 
signaled on July 27, 2017, that the regulatory goal of reforming LIBOR 
was no longer a viable option.103  Andrew Bailey, head of the FCA, 
explained that LIBOR submissions would continue until the end of 2021, 
with a transition to a new benchmark taking place at that time.104  This 
change is due in part to the difficulty of pegging LIBOR to actual 
transactions.105  Bailey enunciated this problem in asking “[i]f an active 
market does not exist, how can even the best benchmark measure it?”106  
What should be concerning is that Bailey has spent a great deal of time 
convincing banks to continue submitting to LIBOR.107   
The uneasiness on the part of contributing banks is 
understandable.  After billions of dollars of fines have been levied for rate 
manipulation, providing rates even in good faith with no transactional 
data to concretely validate those judgments is worrisome.108  Should 
banks stop submitting to LIBOR abruptly, significant market disruptions 
 
 99. Christopher Hall, Comment, Anything for You Big Boy: A Comparative Analysis of 
Banking Regulation in the United States and the United Kingdom in Light of the LIBOR 
Scandal, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 153, 167 (Fall 2013). 
 100. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 22. 
 101. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 7, at 22. 
 102. McBride, supra note 31. 
 103. See Bailey, supra note 8 (indicating that the FCA would focus its efforts on 
transitioning to alternative reference rates based firmly on available transactional data); 
MICHAEL FOUNDETHAKIS, BAKER MCKENZIE, LIBOR: WHERE THINGS STAND NOW (Nov. 27, 
2017), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/11/libor-where-things-
now-stand/. 
 104. Bailey, supra note 8. 
 105. Bailey, supra note 8. 
 106. Bailey, supra note 8. 
 107. Bailey, supra note 8. 
 108. See Hall, supra note 99, at 166 (explaining that the Wheatley Review identified that 
there is both a people problem and a reality problem with the way the LIBOR system is 
designed). 
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will ensue as trillions of dollars of financial contracts are pegged to the 
rate and there will be no clear method to calculate interest charged.109 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO LIBOR 
A. The U.K. Alternative: SONIA 
The search for an alternative to LIBOR in the United Kingdom 
began in earnest in 2013.110  The Bank of England created an independent 
Financial Policy Committee (“FPC”) in order to identify, monitor, and 
take action to remove systemic risks to the U.K. financial system.111  The 
committee identified three areas of action necessary to transition away 
from LIBOR.112  First, there needed to be development of a near risk-free, 
transaction-based, alternative benchmark to LIBOR.113  Second, it was 
necessary to develop robust fallback provisions for financial contracts 
that reference LIBOR.114  Finally, the FPC stated that while an alternative 
rate and fallback provisions were being developed, there needed to be a 
plan for maintenance of LIBOR in the interim.115 
The most popular alternative to LIBOR in the United Kingdom is 
SONIA.116  First published in 1997, SONIA is much newer compared to 
LIBOR.117  SONIA reflects banks’ and building societies’ overnight 
funding rates in the sterling unsecured market and is considered a “risk-
free” rate.118  Unlike LIBOR, SONIA is fully transaction-based, 
underpinned by $51.5 billion—£39.4 billion—in average daily 
 
 109. Bailey, supra note 8. 
 110. Record of FPC Meeting, supra note 10, at 17–18.  
 111. Fin. Policy Comm., BANK OF ENGLAND, (last updated Dec. 4, 2017) http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/fpc/default.aspx. 
 112. Record of FPC Meeting, supra note 10, at 18.  
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 114. Record of FPC Meeting, supra note 10, at 18. 
 115. Record of FPC Meeting, supra note 10, at 18. 
 116. See Reuters, BoE’s Libor Alternative SONIA Backed as Benchmark by Dealers, 
REUTERS (Apr. 28 2017, 3:22 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boe-rates-regulations/
boes-libor-alternative-sonia-backed-as-benchmark-by-dealers-idUSKBN17U0U2 
(explaining that a working group of major dealers voted in April 2017 to back SONIA as their 
preferred alternative to LIBOR). 
 117. The SONIA Interest Rate Benchmark, BANK OF ENGLAND, http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/benchmarks/sonia.aspx (last updated Jan. 9, 
2018). 
 118. SONIA: KEY FEATURES AND POLICIES, supra note 12, at 3; BoE’s Libor Alternative 
SONIA Backed as Benchmark by Dealers, supra note 116. 
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transactions.119  Like LIBOR, SONIA is measured in trimmed mean 
fashion each day.120  Rather than estimates submitted by individual banks, 
however, SONIA is measured as the interest rates paid on eligible sterling 
denominated deposit transactions.121   
Currently, derivatives contracts worth $10.1 billion—£7.7 
billion—are tied to SONIA, but for the most part these are short-term 
contracts extending eighteen months.122  On the other hand, contracts tied 
to LIBOR are worth around $39 trillion—£30 trillion—and extend up to 
fifty years.123  Preparations are already underway to account for the 
difference in the length of the contracts based on these rates with the 
clearing arm of the London Stock Exchange seeking permission from the 
Bank of England to clear longer-dated SONIA swaps.124  To help bridge 
this gap, the London Clearing House is extending the eligibility of 
SONIA based swaps to fifty-one years.125  This will help ensure that the 
potential switch from LIBOR to SONIA will be a relatively seamless 
transition instead of an abrupt cessation of LIBOR that creates significant 
market disruptions.126 
B.  The U.S. Alternative: SOFR 
The United States is also in the process of developing a near risk-
free alternative to LIBOR.127  The Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(“FSOC”) recommended in 2014 that domestic regulators, in cooperation 
with international regulators, develop an alternative reference rate and 
 
 119. The Reform of SONIA: Consultation Feedback and the Design of SONIA, BANK OF 
ENGLAND 6 (2017) [hereinafter Reform of SONIA] https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/
boe/files/markets/benchmarks/reform-of-sonia-consultation-and-feedback-and-design-
march-2017.pdf?la=en&hash=B89ED52B9040464026300A710519D1C7DADD55BB. 
 120. Id. at 7. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Huw Jones & Marc Jones, Foundations for Post-Libor System Sliding into Place, 
REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-libor-
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idUSKBN1AQ1X3. 
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 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. (indicating that the actions being taken by regulators and industry officials 
will increase the chances for a smooth transition). 
 127. Id. 
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transition away from LIBOR.128  In response to this recommendation, the 
Federal Reserve convened the Alternative Reference Rates Committee 
(“ARRC”) in November 2014 to identify a list of reference rates that are 
tied to a robust market.129  In June 2017, the ARRC identified a Broad 
Treasuries Repurchase Agreement (“Repo”) financing rate that will 
reflect how much it costs to borrow cash secured against U.S. government 
debt.130  A Repo is the purchase of an asset, in which one party agrees to 
purchase it at a set price.131  However, a Repo transaction acts as a 
collateralized loan.132  The seller agrees to repurchase the asset at a higher 
price, usually the next day, equating the markup to an interest rate.133  The 
ARRC explained that the rate “represents best practice for use in certain 
new U.S. dollar derivatives and other financial contracts.”134   
The Federal Reserve sought public comment on three rates to be 
published by the New York Fed, with the Broad Treasuries Financing 
Rate being the broadest measure.135  In the early stages of identifying an 
alternative rate the Broad Treasuries Financing Rate chosen by the ARRC 
was referred to as “BTFR,” but it is now being referred to as the Secured 
Overnight Funding Rate, or SOFR.136  The average daily trading volume 
that will be pegged to SOFR is around $660 billion, and the market is 
expected to remain robust.137   
The market for U.S. Treasury Repos includes a tri-party segment 
and a bilateral segment.138  All tri-party Repo transactions, and some 
bilateral Repo transactions, are executed against a pool of general 
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NEW YORK, https://www.newyorkfed.org/arrc/announcements.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2018). 
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 135. Request for Information Relating to Production of Rates, 82 Fed. Reg. 41259 (Fed. 
Reserve Bd. of Governors Aug. 30, 2017). 
 136. See LIBOR Update: One small step for SOFR, LSTA (Sept. 7, 2017), http://
www.lsta.org/news-and-resources/news/libor-update-one-small-step-for-sofr (positing that 
this change is perhaps due to the unsavory pronunciation of the acronym BTFR). 
 137. LIBOR: Why You Should Care . . . and Shouldn’t Panic, LSTA (Aug. 17, 2017), http:/
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collateral rather than a specific security.139  In this type of transaction, the 
purchaser identifies an acceptable amount of collateral, but does not 
specify the exact type of security to be used in the transaction.140  In many 
bilateral Repo transactions, the parties identify the specific securities to 
be acquired.141  Often, depending on the market for the security, Repos 
for a specific security can be placed at much lower rates than general 
collateral and sometimes may even be accepted at a negative return, 
known as “specials.”142  Most of these specials transactions are to be 
excluded from SOFR.143  The New York Fed intends to trim the data, 
removing the rates that fall below a certain percentile for the rate 
calculation each day.144 
C.        Benefits of U.K. and U.S. Alternative Rates 
There are two main reasons why the rates chosen by the United 
Kingdom and United States, SONIA and SOFR respectively, are 
improvements to the current system under LIBOR.  The most important, 
and perhaps most obvious, is that being tied to transactional data reduces 
the incentive for submitters to manipulate the rate.145  By removing the 
dependence on expert opinion, these alternative rates both create a check 
on the submissions of the banks and provide a more accurate rate than the 
estimations involved within the LIBOR system.146 
SONIA, in being tied to transactional data, resolves the 
weaknesses of LIBOR being based in a segment of the market that is no 
longer sufficiently active, as identified in the Wheatley Review.147  
SONIA is based on robust transaction volumes.148  Being fully 
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BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2017, 3:15 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sonia-timeline-
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transaction-based, the submissions to SONIA are tied to concrete activity 
in the market.149  This removes the need to rely solely on the “expert 
opinion” and judgment of the submitters.150  With submissions tied to 
actual transactions, bank manipulation of the rate becomes increasingly 
difficult.151  This change will help hold banks accountable and reduce 
opportunities for misconduct and other improprieties with regards to rate 
manipulation.152 
A potential issue with the switch to SONIA over LIBOR is that 
transactions feeding into the rate are currently published on a daily 
basis.153  As a result of the recommendations of the Wheatley review, 
U.K. regulators delayed publishing the individual submissions to LIBOR 
for three months.154  As a part of the SONIA transition, the Bank of 
England plans to publish SONIA at 9 a.m. GMT the business day 
following the day the rate relates to, allowing time for the Bank to process 
the larger volume of transactions that SONIA will cover.155  LIBOR’s 
three month delay in publication was designed so as not to “inform 
prospective manipulators of the benchmark,” consistent with Wheatley’s 
suggestions for improvements to LIBOR.156  Although Wheatley’s 
review was specifically for LIBOR, his recommendations should apply 
to financial benchmarks as a whole, as they share many of the principles 
recommended for financial benchmarks by the IOSCO.157  SONIA may 
not have the publication delay that LIBOR contains, but being tied to 
transactional data works to remove the issues regarding publication of the 
 
 149. See Reform of SONIA, supra note 113, at 7–8 (showing the eligible transactions that 
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rate because there is a check on the submissions of the banks.158  This 
should have the effect of eliminating the incentive for banks to 
manipulate the rate to make them appear more creditworthy than they 
are.159  
Similar to the United Kingdom’s preferred rate, one of the main 
benefits of the chosen alternative of the United States, SOFR, without 
seeing the ARRC’s final report, is that it will be tied to transactional 
data.160  This should clear up some of the ambiguities and room for 
manipulation allowed for in LIBOR calculation.161  As the rate does not 
yet exist, the next step forward for the transition is somewhat murky 
without more specifics of the rate and a transition plan from the ARRC.162  
The ARRC is planning to release a report in the near future that will detail 
more specifics of the rate, as well as its plan to transition to it, which 
market participants should watch closely.163 
SOFR will not be published until mid-2018.164  To hastily 
transition from LIBOR to a rate that doesn’t yet exist would be unwise.165  
This issue highlights the need for a smooth transition away from LIBOR, 
based on voluntary renegotiation of financial contracts.166  LIBOR will 
continue to be reported for the next few years, or at least until 2021.167  
U.K. and European legislation gives the FCA the power to compel panel 
banks to contribute to LIBOR, and Andrew Bailey has assured that he 
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will use such power if necessary to continue LIBOR publication until that 
point.168  Once SOFR begins to be reported in mid-2018 and becomes 
entrenched in the financial system, contract renegotiation to SOFR will 
be feasible.169 
SOFR, while still a positive change from reliance on LIBOR in 
the United States, presents its own issues that will need to be closely 
monitored over the coming years.170  SOFR is an overnight rate, while 
LIBOR has rates for multiple tenors.171  The International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) has proposed that the fallback rate be 
publicly available as a screen rate and that quotes will be based on tenors 
of one, three, six, and twelve months, as the LIBOR rate is currently 
based.172  To ensure that there is not significant value transfer to LIBOR 
based contracts when the fallback is activated, if LIBOR ceases to be 
reported abruptly, then ISDA has recommended that the fallback should 
consist of SOFR plus a spread.173  That spread would be based on a 
“snapshot” of the LIBOR SOFR basis, or the difference between the cash 
and futures price, across multiple tenors on the last day that LIBOR was 
reported.174 
ISDA’s suggestion of a spread between LIBOR and SOFR will 
help to eliminate the risk of significant market disruptions should LIBOR 
cease to be reported.175  Andrew Bailey, in a July 2017 speech, explained 
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that he will not force banks to continue to contribute to LIBOR after 
2021.176  However, banks will still be able to contribute to LIBOR after 
2021 if they choose.177  Because Bailey had to convince banks to continue 
contributing to the benchmark makes it seem unlikely that LIBOR will 
continue to be reported for very long after Bailey’s deadline.178  
The second benefit of the United States choosing an alternative 
rate that is distinct from the United Kingdom’s preferred rate is that in 
localizing the rate to each jurisdiction, each rate will be less affected by 
market disruptions in other jurisdictions.179  The global financial system 
is undoubtedly linked to events all over the globe.180  With each 
jurisdiction choosing a rate that is pegged to transactions in its own 
currency, the rates should be more resilient to geopolitical events than 
LIBOR.181  It is true that due to the interconnectedness of the global 
markets, it would be naïve to think that a geopolitical event like Brexit 
would not affect U.S. rates.182  However, by choosing SOFR—tied to 
U.S. Treasury repo transactions—the rate should be more resilient to 
geopolitical events outside the United States, particularly in the United 
Kingdom and Europe.183  Higher-risk loans require higher interest rates, 
so when an event like Brexit contributes to an increase in country risk, 
interest rates may reflect that country risk.184    
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While resiliency regarding specific country risk is a positive 
aspect of the alternative rates chosen by the United Kingdom and United 
States, there is a source of concern from the use of these rates.185  One 
potential negative impact is that, given that these rates will be based on 
transactional data, there is a potential for them to be more volatile than 
LIBOR.186  LIBOR submissions require the use of “expert judgment,” 
which may keep the rate steadier than a rate that is tied to actual market 
transactions.187  This ultimately shouldn’t be viewed as a negative for 
these alternative rates, however, because the use of SONIA and SOFR 
will provide a more accurate rate that is indicative of the market rather 
than a rate simply thought up by individuals within a financial 
institution.188   
IV. LOOKING AHEAD:  CONTRACTS AND THE TRANSITION AWAY FROM 
LIBOR 
Should LIBOR cease to be reported after 2021, there are 
potentially going to be millions of financial contracts that do not 
reference an alternative rate.189  Jerome Powell identified that “[t]he big 
financial stability risk here is that you have contracts citing a rate that 
goes out of publication . . . and you don’t have a backup.”190  A complete 
cessation of LIBOR will leave banks and clients with no clear way to 
calculate interest payments—a significant market disruption.191   
Contract holders should revisit their contracts to look at their 
fallback provisions to see if they are sufficient to deal with a potential 
disruption of LIBOR.192  Most fallback provisions currently included in 
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contracts are designed only to resolve temporary disruptions in the 
reporting of LIBOR, not accounting for a permanent cessation of 
LIBOR.193  Structured transaction finance documents with LIBOR 
language generally have a progression of fallback language.194  The last 
resort of these provisions usually refers to the previous month’s rate.195  
Some other financial products have no fallback language at all, creating 
a risk for disputes amongst parties should LIBOR cease to be reported.196  
In order to prevent contracts from being challenged as impossible to 
perform with either no or an insufficient fallback provision, parties 
should ensure that a fallback provision exists.197  In addition, such 
fallback provisions should be written well enough to be able to withstand 
a cessation in the reporting of LIBOR.198 
Parties to transactions should take steps allowing for flexibility to 
make amendments to interest rate determination provisions in 
contracts.199  This is especially important in the context of multi-creditor 
transactions like syndicated lending.200  Parties will want to consider 
whether to allow unilateral amendment by one party, or develop an 
agreement in which amendments can be made by a majority of the 
lenders.201  Amendments to interest rate determination may prove 
difficult for some products, such as over-the-counter interest rate 
swaps.202  In such instances, if the parties decide that the cessation of 
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LIBOR will so materially alter the swap, the parties may mutually agree 
to a no-fault termination.203 
One of the problems associated with amending the terms of 
capital market instruments is that they are often held by a large number 
of underlying investors.204  Currently, in the context of structured finance 
transactions, negative consent provisions are being used to authorize the 
trustee to agree to amendments relating to the cessation of LIBOR.205  In 
order for these negative consent provisions to be valid, some require that 
there be notice of the proposed revisions to all bondholders and that a 
specific percentage of bondholders not object to the proposed amendment 
within a certain time frame.206  If these negative consent provisions are to 
be employed in the use of fallback provisions, these safeguards are 
essential to prevent unilateral amendments to finance documents that 
could produce potential windfalls for lenders.207 
One issue with moving to a risk-free rate from LIBOR is 
accounting for the change of risk from not accounting for bank credit 
risk.208  ISDA has recognized this and, as mentioned previously, has 
pointed out that there will need to be spreads to apply to the risk-free rate 
in the event that a fallback provision is triggered.209  ISDA is currently 
working on a plan, both for the methodology of the calculation of such 
spreads, but also for the entity to calculate and publish those spreads.210  
A potential solution to achieve a peaceful transition away from 
LIBOR would be for the legislative bodies in the United Kingdom and 
United States to enact legislation that determines which rate to reference 
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in the event of the cessation of LIBOR.211  Congress and Parliament could 
declare that in the event LIBOR ceases to be published, the contract in 
question will refer to the rate selected by each country, of course 
determined by the contract’s current LIBOR currency reference.212  For 
example, if a contract is based upon U.S. dollar LIBOR, then the contract 
would then be amended to reference SOFR.213  Likewise, if the contract 
is based upon British pound LIBOR, the contract would then reference 
SONIA.214  If Congress or Parliament were to pass legislation of this 
nature, it should not prohibit the parties to renegotiate the contract if they 
wanted it to reference a different rate than the one selected by either the 
United States or the United Kingdom.215 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both SONIA and SOFR help remedy some of the weaknesses that 
ail LIBOR.216  The Wheatley report proposed tying the LIBOR rate to 
transactional data to help remove the nearly sole use of expert judgment 
in submissions, a reform that was not feasible in the current market.217  
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By pegging these rates to actual transactional data, SONIA and SOFR 
help remove incentives to manipulate the rate in two main ways:  (1) 
removing the need for submitters to rely solely on expert opinion and thus 
reducing the risk of manipulation and (2) removing the room for 
interpretation inherent in the LIBOR structure.218  An additional benefit 
to U.S. and U.K. regulators choosing different rates that are tied to 
transactions in their own currency is increased resiliency of the rates to 
global events.219  Financial contracts that reference LIBOR must be 
renegotiated, and parties should waste no time in developing robust 
fallback provisions and determining how to amend interest rate 
determination clauses.220  Whether regulators can pull off a smooth 
transition that does not result in meaningful market disruptions remains 
to be seen.  What is certain is that the move away from LIBOR is a 
positive change that will help to restore public faith in the global financial 
system.  
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